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THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT ICSID ARBITRATOR DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR LATIN 
AMERICA 
By 
Nora Ciancio
*
 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
 
 In November and December 2013, tribunals constituted under the Rules of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) considered three 
proposals for arbitrator disqualification stemming from investment disputes in Latin 
America, and ultimately disqualified two arbitrators in pending proceedings. While the 
ICSID procedural rules envision challenges to arbitrators, arbitrator disqualification is 
traditionally an extremely rare result in ICSID proceedings.  Accordingly, it is worth 
analyzing whether the recent rise in successful challenges to ICSID arbitrators marks the 
beginning of a new adjudicatory trend, and what such a trend may mean for ICSID 
arbitration.   
 Although arbitrator challenges can extend the time until the final disposal of 
ICSID cases, thereby counteracting the goal of providing efficient resolution of 
investment disputes in the form of arbitration, pursuing more frequent and fully 
adjudicated arbitrator challenges may strengthen an otherwise underutilized provision in 
the ICSID Rules. An increase in challenges would signal that the procedure adequately 
assesses arbitrator qualifications.  Additionally, this growing appearance of 
accountability could prove especially beneficial, as ICSID arbitrations remain common 
occurrences in Latin America, a region historically skeptical of international forums for 
dispute resolution. In part, this skepticism arises from the high rate of claims against 
Latin American nations and neutrality concerns associated with repeat arbitrators.  
  Without state cooperation and support, international investment arbitration will 
not succeed. Thus, participants’ perceptions of the forum’s fairness are crucial to the 
effectiveness of both ICSID and investor-state arbitration in general. In analyzing the 
efficacy of disqualification proceedings in Latin American investment disputes, it is 
imperative that scholars and practitioners remain cognizant of Latin America’s perception 
of ICSID arbitration as an adjudicatory process. More frequent and fully adjudicated 
arbitrator challenges can both signal to participating nations that they have adequate 
means of challenging arbitrators, and can also more clearly define ICSID standards of 
arbitrator qualifications by interpreting arbitrator independence and impartiality. 
 
II.   INVESTMENT ARBITRATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
  
A.  Historically Perceived Inequalities in Arbitration 
  
There is a common argument asserted on behalf of the developing world that 
developed countries’ expansion into and exploitation of emerging markets was for the 
benefit of affluent foreign investors and inured to the detriment of local businesses and 
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markets.
1 Countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America often express that in the course of 
arbitrators’ analyses of investment disputes, arbitration fails to address economic and 
social issues stemming from the exploitation of colonization by the West in equal balance 
with the investors’ legal claims. 2  Developing nations believe both institutional and 
doctrinal bias exists in international arbitration,
3
 and that international arbitration fails to 
address the economic and political vulnerability of such regions.
4
 
History has shaped a distrustful picture of arbitration in the eyes of Latin 
American countries. In response to European aggression in the 19
th
 century, many Latin 
American nations adopted the Calvo Doctrine, which stated that the proper jurisdiction in 
international investment disputes lies with the country in which the investment is 
located.
5
 The Calvo Doctrine encouraged countries to require foreign investors and local 
entities alike to utilize national courts for redress.
6
 Latin American countries, specifically, 
delayed the ratification of the New York Convention and unanimous ratification did not 
occur until 2002.
7
 Furthermore, eleven years after ICSID came into force, no Latin 
American country had ratified the convention.
 8
 
 
B. Latin America and ICSID 
 
The developing world has demonstrated similar reservations pertaining 
specifically to ICSID proceedings due to the perception that the institution was 
                                                 
1
 See Antonius R. Hippolyte, Third World Perspectives on International Economic Governance: A 
Theoretical Elucidation of the “Regime Bias” in Investor-State Arbitration and Its Negative Impact on the 
Economics of Third World States, 2-4 (June 10, 2012) (unpublished working papers series) (available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2080958).  
2
 G. Moon, Trade and Equality: A Relationship to Discover. 12 J. OF INT’L ECON. L., 617, 617(2009) (In 
2007, developing countries share of world trade remained at only 37 percent.  Most was attributable to only 
14 countries, with the remaining 149 developing nations sharing only 7 percent). 
3
 Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of 
Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 424 (2000). 
4
 See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 25. 
5
  See id. at 23 (citing ANGHIE A, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
208 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2nd ed. 2007); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED 
WORLD 50 (Oxford Univ. Press, 4th  ed. 1992)). 
6
   See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Cassese, supra note 5;  J.T. GATHII, THIRD WORLD 
APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE THIRD 
WORLD: RESHAPING JUSTICE  261 (Richard Falk et al., 2008)) (explaining that the Calvo doctrine was 
established in response to the 19
th
 century European aggression against economically weak Latin American 
states and the Calvo doctrine sought to  limit the legal and political power of Western countries, whose 
actions often led to military and political interference) 
7
 See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 12.  
8
 See id.  
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established in the interest of wealthy nations and their investors.
9
 This belief, having built 
over time as a result of adverse decisions, has led to waning commitment to both ICSID 
and international agreements previously executed by Latin American nations. Suspicion 
of ICSID’s bias is exacerbated by the fact that ICSID is part of the World Bank Group, 
and thus acts in support of affluent investors from the United States and Western 
Europe.
10
 
 In explaining the purpose of the ICSID convention, the Report of the Executive 
Directors states that in creating ICSID the Executive Directors were “prompted by the 
desire to strengthen the partnership between countries in the cause of economic 
development” 11  and that “adherence to the Convention by a country would provide 
additional inducement and stimulate a larger flow of private international investment in 
its territories, which is the primary purpose of the Convention”.12  Despite this expressed 
purpose, Latin American nations continue to question the fairness of ICSID proceedings 
because of the economic and power disparities among the developed and developing 
world.
13
 Latin America has repeatedly demonstrated its distrust of ICSID. Initially, 
nineteen Latin American countries voted against the adoption of the ICSID convention, 
which became known at the “No-de-Tokyo”.14 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Latin American nations began to adopt the 
ICSID Convention and entered into numerous Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”).15 
This newfound acceptance brought a high number of claims to ICSID.
16
 As of 2007, 
fifteen percent of concluded matters in ICSID involved claims against Latin American 
countries and as of 2010, this percentage skyrocketed to fifty-two percent.
17
  According 
to the first issue of the 2014 Caseload Statistics, twenty-seven percent of all current 
ICSID cases arose out of South America, and another seven percent originate in Central 
                                                 
9
 Leon E.  Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 605-609 (2012). 
10
 See id. at 611. 
11
 Report of the Executive Directors of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other  States,  ¶ 9 (March 18, 1965). 
12
 Id. at ¶ 12.  
13
 See Hippolyte, supra note 1, at 3-4.  
14
 The “No-de-Tokyo” is known in English-speaking discussions as the “Tokyo No”. Ignacio A. 
Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 409, 418 (2010). 
15
 Id. at 420 (citing Stanimir Alexandrov et al., Making Investment Treaties Work for Latin America, ARB. 
REV. OF THE AM. 4 (2009), available at 
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/13/sections/50/chapters/497/making-investment-treaties-
work-latin-america). 
16
 Id. at 420. 
17 Id. at 420 (citing Int’l Ctr. Of Inv. Disputes, List of Pending Cases, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal, (last visited July 
7, 2010) (as computed with numbers provided by ICSID)). 
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America and the Caribbean.
18
  Currently, thirty-five percent (66/187) of pending cases 
under ICSID concern Latin American nations.
19
 Although these numbers may be skewed 
based on the significant number of disputes caused by the 1998-2002 economic crisis in 
Argentina,
20
 the statistics still establish the overwhelming presence of Latin American 
states in ICSID proceedings.  
 Even though most Latin America nations eventually came to ratify the ICSID 
convention, a renewed resistance to ICSID has cropped up in recent years.
21
  The wave of 
opposition began in April 2007, when the Presidents of Bolivia
22
, Venezuela
23
, Cuba, and 
Nicaragua announced their intended withdrawal from ICSID.
24
  Following suit, on May 
11, 2008, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador publicly announced that he “had no 
confidence in the World Bank arbitration branch [i.e., ICSID] that is hearing U.S. oil 
company Occidental’s lawsuit against Ecuador”25 and explained that “Ecuador handed 
over its sovereignty when it signed international accords binding it to the bank’s 
ICSID”.26 The expressed mistrust of ICSID in Latin America was clarified in part by 
Bolivia’s explanation of its withdrawal. The arguments against ICSID included: (i) 
                                                 
 
18
The ICSID Caseload-Statistics, p.11 (Issue 2012-2) 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics
. 
 
19
 ICSID List of Pending Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (last visited Apr. 6, 2014 2:24 
PM), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending. 
20
 See Vincentelli supra note 14, at 423-24 (citing Paolo Di Rosa, The Recent Waive of Arbitration Against 
Argentina Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: Background and Principal Issues, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 
L. REV. 41, 73 (2005) (explaining that the financial crisis in 2001 and 2002 in Argentina led to dozens of 
claims being filed by foreign investors against the state and led it to be the country with the most claims 
filed in ICSID)). 
21
 See Vincentelli, supra note 14, at 419, 421.  
22
  ICSID News Release, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. (July 9, 2009), 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Announcement20.  
23
 Venezuela did not officially submit a notice of denunciation until 2012.  ICSID News Release,  INT’L 
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP. ( Jan. 26, 2012),       
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType
=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement10.  
24
  Cuba and Nicaragua never officially submitted a notice of denunciation under Article 71of ICSID. Id. at 
421. 
25
  See Vincentelli, supra note 14, at 422 (citing See Gabriel Molina, Ecuador Wary of World Bank 
Arbitration in Occidental Case, USA TODAY, (MAY 11, 2008), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-05-11-3404362337). 
26
 Id.  
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ICSID awards are not subject to appeal; (ii) the fact that a vast majority of ICSID awards 
have been decided in favor of the private investors shows that the system lacks neutrality 
and impartiality; (iii) only private companies may sue at this forum; and (iv) the cost to 
litigate these claims is very high.
27
  The manner and impact of these denunciations are 
somewhat unclear,
28
 but nonetheless, these actions and rationales demonstrate aggressive 
manifestations of displeasure with the forum as a facilitator of fair investment dispute 
resolution. Because no ICSID disputes have yet dealt with denunciation,
29
 the 
implications of denunciation on the party consent and status as a contracting state as 
conditions for ICSID jurisdiction are unknown.
30
  It remains unclear whether host states 
can revoke their consent to arbitrate given by BITs through an ICSID denunciation and 
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the potential for investors to continue to bring 
cases after the deposit of the denunciation notice or after the six month period mandated 
before the denunciation comes into effect.
31
 After denunciation, there is no existing 
definitive standard that dictates or describes the denouncing state’s relationship with 
ICSID moving forward. 
Because prevailing arguments state that systemic incentives (e.g., financial gain) 
push arbitrators to decide in favor of investors to maximize the popularity of investor-
state proceedings and increase the likelihood of their reappointment,
32
 it can be said that 
this lack of independence and impartiality exemplifies institutional bias.  Furthermore, 
signatories to the ICSID convention have an obligation to recognize and enforce ICSID 
awards, and, thus, awards are often considered automatic.
33
 Articles 53(1) of the ICSID 
rules provide that an award rendered is binding and cannot be appealed unless 
enforcement is stayed pursuant to ICSID provisions.
34
 The perceived automatic 
                                                 
27
 Id. at 422-23 (citing See Bolivia se va del CIADI, THE WORLD BANK (Nov. 3, 2007), 
http://go.worldbank. org/2L60II0X80 (explaining that these reasons are enumerated in the World Bank 
press release (in Spanish) announcing Bolivia’s exit to ICSID)).  
28
  Wolfgang Alschner et al., Legal Basis and Effect of Denunciation Under International Investment 
Agreements (May 9, 2910) (unpublished research paper, The Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies) (on file with The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies).  
29
 Id.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Id.  
32
 William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 629, 
651 (2009).  
33
 James W. Barratt and Margarita N Michael, The ‘Automatic’ Enforcement of ICSID Awards: The 
Elephant in the Room, THE EUROPEAN, MIDDLE EASTERN AND AFRICAN ARBITRATION REVIEW, (2014), 
available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/58/sections/202/chapters/2274/the-automatic-
enforcement-icsid-awards-elephant-room/ (This article sheds light on the current discussion that ICSID 
awards may not be technically ‘automatic’ because the procedure of enforcement is governed by the laws 
of the country in which the enforcement is sought. Article summaries go in parentheticals). 
34
 See id (explaining ICSID Article 53(1)).  
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enforcement as pertaining to members of ICSID may be seen to developing nations as 
another procedural disadvantage. In the event states believe an award to be unjust, 
developing nations cannot turn to an appeal process to remedy the matter. 
Because ICSID as a forum does not have a system of precedents or a formal law 
of foreign direct investment much of the alleged bias asserted above manifests itself at 
the individual arbitrator level. Scholarship discussing Latin American participation in 
ICSID suggests that the lack of arbitrator independence and impartiality is viewed by 
Latin American states as an institutional bias and has been a point of contention regarding 
international investment arbitration.
35
  
 
III.   INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR ARBITRATORS AS NEUTRALS 
 
Neutrality is vital for effective adjudication.  Although an absolute standard of 
neutrality has been repeatedly held as a desirable and defining standard for adjudicators,
36
 
                                                 
35 One of the greatest criticisms of investment arbitration is the impartiality of arbitrators. Critics believe 
that arbitrators produce decisions reflecting their own ideologies and personal self-interests and in a way to 
maximize their likelihood of future appointments. Catherine A. Rogers, The Politics of International 
Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 217, 219 (2013). Another criticism voiced is that 
investment arbitrators favor investments over state interests in order to increase personal business 
opportunities or because of policy preferences. Id. at 220 ((citing Cf. Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: 
Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L. J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (hypothesizing that in 
domestic arbitration, by ignoring applicable mandatory rules, arbitration can  “develop a reputation as a 
desirable arbitrator” and thus increase their chance at future selection); This concern is echoed by many 
scholars. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Powers and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual 
Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 207 (2010)). In contrast, defenders argue that developing 
reputations for impartiality is of a greater self-interest in the career of an arbitrator than reappointment and 
that partisan bias would be counterproductive. Id. at 220-21 ((citing Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. 
Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009)). However, in a 2010 study, a leading arbitrator and scholar, Albert Van den Berg, 
demonstrated that nearly all dissents written by party-appointed arbitrators are written in favor of the 
appointing party, which that the promotion of self-interest among arbitrators affects the neutrality of 
international arbitration. See id. at 235 ((citing Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-
Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (2010)). 
36
 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeus Corpus, Due Process and the Suspension Clause: A 
Study In the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1379 (2010) (citing See, 
e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (holding that an individual detained by the government 
was entitled to a neutral adjudicator “as a matter of due process of law”); Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57, 61–62 (1972) (concluding that due process requires “a neutral and detached judge in the first 
instance”); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (“While ‘[m]any controversies have raged about . . . 
the Due Process Clause,’ . . . it is fundamental that except in emergency situations (and this is not one) due 
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate [a protected] interest . . . , it must afford ‘notice and 
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination becomes effective.’”) 
(quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (“That officers acting in a 
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of 
course, the general rule.”)) (explaining that a neutral adjudicator is an essential principle of due process in 
the U.S)).;  See Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in International 
Adjudication, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 111, 111 (2008) (expressing that there is an intuition that 
international adjudicators should not have preconceived notions on issues arising in the case). Catherine A. 
Rogers, Regulating International Arbitrators: A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 
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it becomes convoluted when it is carried over to arbitration.
37
 Non-neutral arbitrators are 
said to possess a conflict of interest and can ultimately lead to disqualification. The often 
elusive concept of neutrality is further complicated in the realm of investment arbitration, 
in which the pool of arbitrators is noticeably small
38
 and in which repeat appointments 
are common.
39
  
 
A. Repeat Appointments and Theories of Arbitrator Motivation 
 
The term “repeat arbitrator” refers to an arbitrator who has been appointed by the 
same company or industry group persistently.
40
 In international arbitration, party input in 
the arbitrator selection and disqualification process allows participating parties to feel 
comfortable with the legitimacy of the tribunal.
41
 When party input results in the 
reappointment of arbitrators, however, the legitimacy of the tribunal may be 
compromised.  In the context of investor-state arbitration administered by ICSID, this 
practice can create the perception that the forum is an institutionally biased mechanism 
designed to protect the interests of merely one side of the dispute. 
Institutional bias refers to the propensity for outcomes to favor one class of 
participants over another.
42
 Bias is perceived to be institutional if the causes of the 
uneven outcomes are widely distributed throughout the entire arbitral system.
43
 When 
looking at ICSID disputes, outcomes suggest that arbitrators favor claimant-investors in 
order to promote their own reappointment.
44
 An opposite tendency would arguably 
diminish the attractiveness of ICSID arbitration in the eyes of investors, decreasing its 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 STAN. J INT’L L. 53, 56 (2005) (citing John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 237 (1987)) (explaining that impartiality is a defining feature of a judge. 
37
 See Rogers, supra note 36, at 56. 
38
 See Margaret Moses, Reasoned Decisions in Arbitrator Challenges 6 (UNIV. OF CHI. SCH. OF L., Pub. L. 
& Legal Theory Research Paper, No. 2012-011), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114551. 
39
 See Chiara Giorgetti, Challenges of Arbitrators in International Disputes: Two Tribunals Reject the 
“Appearance of Bias” Standard, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jun. 6, 2012), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/20/challenges-arbitrators-international-disputes-two-
tribunals-reject-#_edn32. 
40
 See Park, supra note 32, at 653 (citing see generally Fatima-Zahra Slaoui, The Rising Issue of “Repeat 
Arbitrators”: A Call for Clarification, 25 ARB. INT’L 103 (2009)). 
41
 See Trakman, supra note 13, at 659. 
42
 See Roger J. Peristadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1983, 
1985-86 (2002). 
43
 Id. at 1986.  
44
 See Park, supra note 32, at 658 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC 
LAW, 175-84 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007)). 
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usage as an adjudicatory process. Creating an overall investor-friendly forum remains 
more lucrative for arbitrators because it increases the overall number of disputes they can 
potentially adjudicate in the future. This proves to be particularly true in the case of 
ICSID, a World Bank affiliate.
45
 One scholar suggests, “as merchants of adjudicative 
services, arbitrators have a financial stake in furthering [arbitration’s] appeal to 
claimants” that can lead to an “apprehension of bias in favour of allowing claims and 
awarding damages against governments.”46 
 
B.  The Standard of Neutrality in Arbitration – Conflict of Interest 
 
According to scholarly analysis of the concept of neutrality, conflicts of interest 
can be classified as either: 1) lack of independence; or 2) arbitrator impartiality.
47
  The 
former contemplates improper connections an arbitrator may have to the dispute.  Some 
examples include financial relationships with an adjudicating party, or personal financial 
interests in the underlying investment.
48
 Arbitrator impartiality contemplates arbitrators’ 
preconceived notions that could threaten the neutrality of the arbitral process. Examples 
include biases toward favored nations, prior unrelated relationships with one or both 
parties, or other personal biases that could inspire party favoritism by an arbitrator.  For 
international arbitration to function as a trusted form of investment adjudication, it is 
essential that international arbitrators remain both independent and impartial.
49
 Appointed 
arbitrators should not have any economic or emotional links to the dispute.
50
 One 
commentator notes that, “Although few people are free of predispositions in an absolute 
sense, some will prove relatively more detached than others with respect to any given 
dispute”. 51  While helpful in articulating a mission of equity and fairness in ICSID 
arbitration, clear definitions of independence and impartiality remain evasive. 
Accordingly, it will prove valuable to future proceedings to clearly define the amount of 
acceptable bias allowable to still render arbitrators independent and impartial, and will 
                                                 
45
 See id. at 653-8 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, 152-3, 
16 ( Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (discussing that the counterargument to arbitrators seeking repeat 
appointment is that such action is counterintuitive and would in fact decrease the chance of reappointment 
by tarnishing their reputation as an unbiased adjudicator. Further, some believe there is a stronger incentive 
for arbitrators to safeguard their professional status as neutral adjudicators and be respected among peers). 
46
 Id. at 651 (citing Gus Van Harten, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW, 152-53 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2007)).  
47
 Id.at 636 .  
48
  See id. 
49
 See Park, supra note 44, at 637. 
50
 See id. 
51
 Id. at 632. 
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instill confidence in developing nations that the arbitral process is a fair form of 
adjudication.
52
  
 
C. The Duty to Disclose 
 
Another key question that remains is to what extent an arbitrator must disclose 
past, present, and potential conflicts of interest and the consequences of failing to 
disclose these possible conflicts of interest.
53
  As noted in scholarly commentary on the 
topic, there is a notion that arbitrators are less impartial than judges due to several factors 
including that arbitrators in identifying a conflict of interest, are often required to act 
contrary to their own financial interest, and the ability of parties to select arbitrators that 
serve party interests.
54
 Disclosure of disqualifying relationships is particularly suspect 
when arbitrators are given the task of self-diagnosing a conflict of interest because at 
times, disclosure of a conflict of interest can cost an arbitrator hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in relinquished fees.
55
 However, the decision of whether to disclose is extremely 
important in the arbitration proceedings because failure to do so can lead to nullification 
or non-enforcement.
56
  
Subject to some variation, the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International 
Arbitration, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce rules all prescribe a duty, at the 
outset and throughout the proceeding, to disclose “any facts or circumstances which 
might be of such a nature as to call into question the arbitrator’s independence in the eyes 
of the parties,” or if “circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubt’s as to the 
arbitrator’s impartiality and  independence.” 57 Furthermore, in these forums, arbitrator 
reappointment in two or more related cases raises questions about the arbitrator’s 
independence, especially where prior cases exposed the arbitrator to privileged 
information that could prejudice an arbitrating party.
58
  
ICSID provides for a less detailed duty to disclose in its rules. Under Rule 6(2) 
                                                 
52
  See Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for 
International Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341, 362 (2002).  
53
 David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures: Are we Making a Mountain out of a 
Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV.  879, 880  (2008). 
54
  See Rogers, supra note 36, at 71-74.  
55
 See id. at 72. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Piero Bernardini, ICSID Versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration, THE INTERNATIONAL 
COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-investent.pdf (citing The London Court of 
International Arbitration, Rules, art. 10.3; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Arbitration Rules, art, 10;  The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce,  Arbitration Rules, art. 14(2)). 
58
 See Bernardini, supra note 57.  
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each arbitrator is required to produce a declaration, stating that he or she has disclosed: 
… (a) my past and present professional, business and other 
relationships (if any) with the parties and (b) any other 
circumstance that might cause my reliability for independent 
judgment to be questioned by a party. I acknowledge that by 
signing this declaration, I assume a continuing obligation promptly 
to notify the Secretary-General of the Centre of any such 
relationship or circumstance that subsequently arises during this 
proceeding.
59
 
 
Article 13(2) of the Additional Facility Rules
60
 calls for similar actions, but uses even 
broader language, stating that an arbitrator shall sign “a statement of my past and present 
professional, business or other relevant relationships (in any) with the parties is attached 
hereto.” Both of these provisions fail to elaborate on the types of relationships that would 
affect the arbitrator’s “independent judgment” and are especially silent on whether repeat 
appointments would run afoul of the intent of the disclosure requirement.  
 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ICSID PROCESS ON ARBITRATOR SELECTION AND        
DISQUALIFICATION 
 
 ICSID’S arbitrator selection and disqualification processes are wrought with 
deficiencies that convolute the duties of arbitrators and disputing parties when issues of 
arbitrator independence and impartiality arise.  Because so few arbitrator 
disqualifications have been fully adjudicated, the standards for arbitrator qualifications 
enumerated in the rules are left vague and unclear due to the lack of application or 
guidance.  
 
A. The Arbitrator Selection Process 
  
The composition of the Tribunal is described in Convention Article 37 (2) (a), 
which sets forth that  “the Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator or any uneven number 
of arbitrators as the parties shall agree.”61 Under this, freedom of party contract will 
dictate the selection process unless none exists, in which case Article 37 (2) (b) will 
preside. Article 37(2)(b) states,  “ Where the parties do not agree upon the number of 
arbitrators and the method of their appointment, the Tribunal shall consist of three 
arbitrators, one arbitrator appointed by each party and the third, who shall be the 
                                                 
59
  The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (hereinafter “ICSID”), Rules of 
Procedure For Arbitration Proceedings (hereinafter “Arbitration Rules”), and Regulations, R. 6(2), Apr. 
2006. 
60
 ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, art. 13(2), Jan. 2003. 
61
 ICSID, Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States And Nationals of Other 
States (hereinafter “Convention”), art. 37 (2)(a).  
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president of the Tribunal, appointed by the agreement of the parties.”62  The appointment 
of arbitrators under Article 37 (2)(b) is dictated by Rule 3 of the Arbitration Rules of 
ICSID that states either party in communication to the other party shall: 
 
…name two persons, identifying one of them, who shall not have 
the same nationality as nor be a national of either party, as the 
arbitrator appointed by it, and the other as the arbitrator proposed 
to be the President of the Tribunal; and invite the other party to 
concur in the appointment of the arbitrator proposed to be the 
President of the Tribunal and to appoint another arbitrator.
63
   
 
In response, the other party must reply with the name of their choice of arbitrator 
appointment, and also must either concur in the appointment of the arbitrator proposed to 
be the President of the Tribunal or offer an alternative person for this role.
64
  If an 
alternative is offered, the initiating party shall also notify the replying party of whether it 
concurs in the appointment of the alternative proposal of President of the Tribunal.
65
 In 
the event that ninety days or another agreed upon length of time passes after the dispatch 
from the Secretary-General of the notice of the registration and the Tribunal is still not 
completely formed, either party may request that the Chairman complete the appointment 
process by selecting the remaining arbitrators and designating one to be President of the 
Tribunal.
66
 
During the appointment process, parties are responsible for selecting adjudicators 
that exhibit certain characteristics. Article 14(1) establishes the criteria for arbitrators on 
ICSID tribunals:  
 
Persons designated to serve on the Panels shall be persons of high 
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, 
commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment. Competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons on the Panel of 
Arbitration. 
67
 
 
Despite the assertion that arbitrators must exercise independent judgment, the term 
“independent,” is largely left undefined in the context of Article 14(1). Increased 
                                                 
62
 Id. at art. 37 (2)(b). 
63
 See ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 59, at r. 3(1)(a).  
64
 Id. at r. 3(1)(b). 
65
 Id.  
66
 Id. at 4(1). 
67
See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, at art. 14(1).  
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accountability in arbitration will contribute to a perception of legitimacy by clarifying to 
arbitrators and parties alike what type of conduct is acceptable an unacceptable and thus, 
can aide in correcting some of the limitations set in the ICSID rules.
68
 
 
B. The Arbitrator Disqualification Process 
 
The standard for arbitrator disqualification is provided in Article 57 of the ICSID 
Rules, which states:  
 
A party may propose to a Commission or Tribunal the 
disqualification of any of its members on account of any fact 
indicating a manifest
69
 lack of the qualities required by paragraph 
(1) of Article 14. A party to arbitration proceedings, may, in 
addition, propose the disqualification of an arbitrator on the ground 
that he was ineligible for appointment to the Tribunal under 
Section 2 of Chapter IV.
70
 
 
Relying on Article 14(1), as referred to previously, the disqualification process fails to 
develop identifiable characteristics of arbitrators that will lead to disqualification.  
Article 58 then lays out the process of review of the proposal: 
  
The decision on any proposal to disqualify a conciliator or 
arbitrator shall be taken by the other members of the Commission 
or Tribunal as the case may be, provided that where those members 
are equally divided, or in the case of a proposal to disqualify a sole 
conciliator or arbitrator, or a majority of the conciliators or 
arbitrators, the Chairman
71
 shall take that decision. If it is decided 
                                                 
68
  See Rogers, supra note 36, at 72. 
69
 Multiple decisions have concluded that manifest is defined as “evident” or “obvious.” Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona SA. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Cases Nos. ARB/03/17 and 
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71 (May 20, 2011); Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Europe v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/13, Decision on Claimant's Proposal to Disqualify Mr. Gabriel Bottini from the Tribunal 
under Article 57 of the ICSID Convention, ¶ 59 (February 27, 2013), 
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  See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, at art. 57.  
71
 As defined in Article 5 of the ICSID Convention, the President of the Bank shall be ex officio Chairman 
of the Administrative Council (hereinafter called the Chairman) but shall have no vote. During his absence 
or inability to act during any vacancy in the office of President of the Bank, the person for the time being 
acting as President shall act as Chairman of the Administrative Council. See ICSID Convention, supra note 
61, at art. 5. 
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that the proposal is well-founded, the conciliator or arbitrator to 
whom the decision relates shall be replaced in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 2 of Chapter III or section 2 of Chapter IV.
72
 
 
Interpretation of Article 14(1) and its application to the challenged arbitrator is initially 
assigned to the members of the panel not in question, who must determine if the 
arbitrator’s conduct or relationships reach that standard of apparent bias.73  As stated 
above, in the event that the Tribunal cannot reach consensus in deciding on the proposal 
for disqualification, the decision shall be reserved for the Chairman. Past studies have 
shown that arbitrators are often reluctant to disqualify colleagues,
74
 and more often than 
not, the decision then gets pushed to the Chairman in a majority of cases.
75
  
Because disqualification goes first to the remaining members of the Tribunal, 
followed by potential deference to the Chairman, this procedure can lengthen the process 
of adjudication. This peculiar procedure, not present in non-ICSID disqualifications of 
arbitrators, creates a system within ICSID that makes it difficult and time consuming to 
disqualify arbitrators.
76
 However, the rules emphasize that this portion of the adjudication 
is to be handled efficiently. Pursuant to Article 15 in the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules
77
 and Rule 9 of ICSID’s Rules of Arbitration,78 a proposal for disqualification of an 
arbitrator shall be made promptly and before the proceeding is declared closed.
79
 After 
the proposal is filed with the Secretary-General, the Secretary-General must transmit the 
proposal to the Tribunal and the Chairman if necessary, and notify the other party of the 
proposal.
80
 The accused arbitrator may without delay submit explanations to the Tribunal 
or Chairman. In the event that the Chairman has to decide on a proposal to disqualify, he 
                                                 
72
 See ICSID Convention, supra note 61, at art. 58. 
73
 Although it is unclear why ICSID often relies on the standard of “apparent bias”, one can speculate that 
the standard is adopted from a US arbitration case, Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 
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 See supra note 3, at 426. 
75
 KAREL DAELE, CHALLENGE AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ARBITRATORS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
106 (Kluwer Law International ed., 2012). 
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 See generally id. at 106-110.  
77
 See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 60, at art. 15. 
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  See ICSID Rules of Arbitration, supra note 59, at r. 9. 
79
 See ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra note 60, at art. 15(2). 
80
 Id. at art. 15(3). 
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must use his best efforts to take that decision within 30 days.
81
 However, in the event that 
the Chairman exceeds the 30–day recommendation, ICSID does not provide for any 
safeguards to move the process forward.  Article 15(7) firmly states that the proceeding 
shall be suspended until a decision has been taken on the proposal. 
82
 
 
 C. The Process of Filling Vacancies.  
 
In the case of the disqualification, death, incapacity or resignation of an arbitrator, 
Rule 11(1) provides the process for filling the resulting vacancy:  
 
Except as provided in paragraph (2), a vacancy resulting from the 
disqualification, death, incapacity or resignation of an arbitrator 
shall be promptly filled by the same method by which his 
appointment had been made.
83
  
 
Paragraph 2 provides that the Chairman shall appoint a person from the Panel of 
Arbitrators: 
 
(a) to fill a vacancy caused by the resignation, without consent of 
the Tribunal, of an arbitrator appointed by a party; or (b) at the 
request of either party, to fill any other vacancy, if no new 
appointment is made and accepted within 45 days of the 
notification of the vacancy by the Secretary-General.
84
 
 
 Under R 11(1), the disqualification of an arbitrator will thus result in allowing the 
appointing party to fill the vacancy.  At this stage, the appointing party might be inclined 
to choose a new arbitrator that is more impartial or independent, but will still have the 
strong incentive to appoint an arbitrator that will serve party needs with regards to subject 
matter expertise or favorable perspective of the law.  Therefore, disqualification alone 
does not provide an assurance of a more-neutral replacement. 
 
D.  Statistics on Arbitrator Disqualification 
 
   Collected figures reveal the infrequency of arbitrator disqualification. The 
success rate for arbitrator challenges in ICSID currently hovers around a meager three 
percent.
85
 From the early 1980’s through 2011, there have been a total of forty-two 
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challenges, nine of which resulted in resignation by the implicated arbitrators.
86
   ICSID’s 
case statistics do not provide for a statistical break down of resignations, 
disqualifications, and proposals for disqualification that are overruled.  Because 
publication of disqualifications is optional and needs consent from all parties, statistics 
arising from these decisions is limited and provide little guidance.  Furthermore, even if a 
complete set of data existed regarding the limited decisions on disqualifications, the 
miniscule sample size would restrict the formation of reliable conclusions.  
 Whether these numbers demonstrate success or failure is illusive due to the re-
appointment process described previously. In all but one scenario, both arbitrator 
resignations and disqualifications give the party that originally appointed that arbitrator 
another opportunity to select an arbitrator for the tribunal, as discussed in Article 11(1). 
The only situation in which that right would be taken from the appointing party is 
enumerated in ICSID rule 8(2)
 87
 and Article 14(3) of the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules,
88
 which state that, when the arbitrator resigned without the consent of the 
continuing members of the Panel, the Chairman is delegated the task of filling the 
vacancy.
89
 In every case but one, Victor Pey v. Chile, the tribunal consented to the 
resignation.
90
 Therefore, in eight out of the nine resignations, the original appointing 
authority was able to appoint an arbitrator of their choosing to fill the vacancy. Because 
resignation absent consent is rare, neutrality of arbitrators is still questionable in the 
majority of cases in which resignation has occurred. Until 2011, twenty-nine challenges 
were rejected, and three challenges did not go forward.
91
  Ultimately, only one resulted in 
disqualification.
92
   
 
E. Payment Process 
 
 The process for payment of arbitrator fees under ICSID may encourage 
arbitrators to both fail to disclose conflicts of interest and decide in favor of investors in 
order to maximize potential earnings. The evident self-interest created through the 
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 Id. at 6 (citing See Karel Daele, Interview, IA REPORTER, (Jun, 8, 2011) (For criticisms of the ICSID 
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payment process further frustrates the goal of setting standards of independence and 
impartiality by creating a system in which arbitrators are motivated to conceal their lack 
of neutrality.   
Article 60 of the Convention establishes that “Each Commission and each 
Tribunal shall determine the fees and expenses of its members within limits established 
from time to time by the Administrative Council and after consultation with the 
Secretary-General.”93 In addition to allowing for a changeable calculation of fees for 
arbitrators, Article 60 also upholds freedom of contract in allowing party agreements in 
advance with the Commission or Tribunal about fees and expenses of its members.
94
 
Party agreements on the calculation of fees for arbitrators will supersede ICSID 
regulations on the same matter. In the event that parties do not have a controlling 
agreement on the calculation of fees, Regulation 14 of the Financial Provisions listed 
under the Administrative and Financial Regulations provides that members of a Tribunal 
shall receive fees, allowances, and travel expenses as determined by the Secretary-
General with the approval of the Chairman.
95
  The members of the Tribunal are 
compensated by the Centre, and not by individual parties.
96
 Even though arbitrators will 
get compensated for their provided services no matter the outcome of a specific dispute, 
siding with investors will increase the potential for reappointment in the future by making 
ICSID a more attractive forum to foreign investors.  
 
F. Potential Effects 
 
Increased accountability and the clarification of standards of independence and 
impartiality will contribute to a perception of legitimacy by dictating to arbitrators and 
parties alike what type of conduct is acceptable and unacceptable and thus, can aid in 
correcting some of the limitations of the ICSID rules.
97
 One of the major limitations of 
ICSID rules is the vague standards set forth previously in Rule 14 that fails to define what 
constitutes “independence,” which makes it difficult both for parties to identify 
adjudicators who meet this qualification, and for arbitrators to know what circumstances 
mandate a duty to disclose. Furthermore, the disqualification process complicates the 
removal of unfit arbitrators by lengthening the arbitration proceedings and reducing both 
the efficiency of utilizing ICSID to adjudicate international disputes thereby decreasing 
the attractiveness of international investment arbitration in general.  Even after a 
successful disqualified, as seen in Rule 11, allows for appointment of the replacement by 
the same original method and, thus, does not ensure more independent or impartial 
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adjudicators. The infrequency of arbitrator disqualification and low success rate warrants 
a discussion not only of the procedure’s efficacy,98 but also demonstrates that ICSID 
should amend its process to challenge arbitrators in order to fulfill the overall goal of 
maintaining the integrity and fairness of arbitration as an adjudicatory process.
99
 In order 
to promote efficiency in the adjudication process and instill confidence within Latin 
American parties as to the integrity and fairness of ICSID proceedings, it is essential to 
establish standards of independence, impartiality, and identify behavior that demonstrates 
a manifest lack of these qualities so that parties will be able to (a) initially appoint an 
impartial and independent arbitrator and (b) in filling vacancies on the Tribunal, appoint 
an impartial and independent replacement so as not to extend the length of the 
proceedings and risk further disqualifications and (c) have confidence that arbitrators 
exhibiting partiality or dependence will be held accountable. 
 
IV.   RECENT DISQUALIFICATIONS 
 
 A. Blue Bank v. Venezuela 
 
On June 25, 2012, Blue Bank International & Trust (hereinafter “Blue Bank”) 
filed a request for ICSID arbitration against the Venezuela.
100
 Blue Bank alleged that 
Venezuela breached the 1994 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments (the “Agreement”), a bilateral investment treaty (“BIT”) between Barbados 
and Venezuela.
101
 On October 8, 2012, Blue Bank appointed Mr. José María Alonso 
(hereinafter “Alonso”) as its arbitrator.102  Venezuela, in turn, appointed Dr. Santiago 
Torres Bernárdez (hereinafter “Bernárdez”) from Spain as its arbitrator.103   
Venezuela submitted a proposal to disqualify Alonso under Article 57 of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules.
104
  Although Blue Bank also submitted a proposal to disqualify 
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Bernárdez as an arbitrator,
105
 Bernárdez submitted his resignation from the tribunal and 
thus, the Chairman did not analyze the proposal to dismiss Bernárdez. 
106
 
 Venezuela opposed the appointment of Alonso due to his position at Baker & 
McKenzie, a firm that represented Blue Bank in Longreef Investments A.V.V v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
107
 Venezuela further asserted that Alonso is a member 
of international committees within his firm, and that part of his compensation depended 
on the global returns of the firm.
108
 In Venezuela’s view, these facts established a direct 
and indirect economic interest in the outcome of the case, giving rise to reasonable 
doubts regarding Alonso’s independence and impartiality.109  
 In response, Blue Bank stated that Venezuela mischaracterized the facts and legal 
standard by incorrectly describing Alonso’s role in the firm’s International Arbitration 
Steering Committee.
110
 Blue Bank believed that Venezuela had not proved a manifest 
lack of impartiality or independence, and more specifically that the standard established 
by the term “manifest” was not met.111 Thus, Blue Bank requested that the proposal to 
disqualify Alonso be denied.
112
  
 Alonso’s argument was threefold. First, he argued that the Baker & McKenzie 
offices representing Longreef–located in New York and Caracas–are independently 
functioning legal entities that function separately from Alonso’s office.  Accordingly, 
Alonso’s association with a single Baker & McKenzie office would not create conflicts 
with clients of other offices.
113
 Second, Alonso asserted that he did not lead the global 
arbitration practice at Baker & McKenzie, and thus, his participation in the International 
Arbitration Steering Committee did not meet the standard for disqualification under the 
ICSID convention.
114
 Third, Alonso offered that his income as a partner of the Madrid 
office depends solely on the profit derived at that office and not on the financial situation 
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at the New York and Caracas offices.
115
  Accordingly, Alonso concluded that the 
Chairman had no basis to find reasonable doubt as to his impartiality because he did not 
and had never personally represented either of the parties, had never acted against the 
respondent, and he had no economic or other interest in the result of Longreef.
116
 The 
motion for disqualifications brought by Venezuela alleged a manifest lack of the qualities 
required by paragraph (1) of Article 14 of the ICSID Convention.
117
 
The Chairman’s analysis of the party arguments notes an inconsistency between 
the English and Spanish versions of Article 14, in which the English version refers to 
“independent judgment,” while the Spanish version requires “imparcialidad de juicio 
(impartiality of judgment).” 118  Because both versions are considered authentic, the 
accepted view is that arbitrators must be both impartial and independent.
119
 
  The Chairman stated that “Impartiality refers to the absence of bias or 
predisposition towards a party” and that “independence is characterized by the absence of 
external control.” 120  Both independence and impartiality “protect parties against 
arbitrators being influenced by factors other than those related to the merits of the 
case.”121 Furthermore, Article 57 and 14(1) of the ICSID convention do not require proof 
of actual dependence or bias, but only require the appearance of dependence or bias for 
disqualification actions to be appropriate.
122
 The Chairman asserted that the only 
guidelines that bind him or her are those of the ICSID and others, such as the IBA 
guidelines, may be useful references. The decision he makes can only be according to 
Articles 57 and 58 as set forth by ICSID.
123
   
 In analyzing the proposal to disqualify Alonso, the Chairman found significant 
that Alonso’s compensation from the International Arbitration Steering Committee relied 
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primarily, but not exclusively, on the financial performance of the Madrid office.
124
  
According to the Chairman, the fact that even a small part of Alonso’s compensation was 
contingent on factors other than the performance of the Madrid office was enough to 
trigger a conflict with the Longreef adjudication.
125
  Moreover, the Chairman concluded 
that the Blue Bank adjudication would likely present substantively similar issues to those 
arising in Longreef, which would present additional conflicts under the ICSID rules.
126
   
Therefore, the Chairman disqualified Alonso under Articles 14(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.
127
   
  
B. Implications of Blue Bank 
 
 Even though Chairman’s disqualification of Alonso was based on his speculation 
about a lack of independence and theoretical impartiality, his reasoning marks the initial 
steps in formulating a comprehensible standard for conflicts of interest that render an 
adjudicator partial under ICSID. It also begins to establish a standard for when an 
arbitrator has a duty to disclose such conflicts.  Under the Chairman’s analysis, an 
arbitrator’s financial ties, however tentative and indirect, to a firm that has a prior 
relationship with the claimant-investor, can create a conflict of interest, and demonstrates 
that the adjudicator in question lacks the necessary qualities of independence and 
impartiality as established in Rule 14, quoted beforehand.  Additionally, as previously 
referred to in Rule 6, Alonso had a duty to disclose any relationship or circumstance in 
which the reliability for independent judgment to be questioned by a party.  Accordingly, 
even though not specified by the Chairman in the Blue Bank decision, Alonso should 
have disclosed his full relationship with Baker & McKenzie.  
Although the Chairman’s decision on the proposal for disqualification in Blue 
Bank is a crucial first-step in establishing which financial and professional relationships 
can negate the independence and impartiality of arbitrators and render the appointment of 
such arbitrators inappropriate under ICSID, the Chairman’s analysis is underdeveloped.  
It is not uncommon for arbitrators to have past or current careers with law firms. Without 
the Chairman’s ability or willingness to adequately show how Alonso’s position at Baker 
& McKenzie and ties to Longreef cause him to be partial in the current proceedings raises 
question as to the existence of actual bias. The tentative relationship established between 
Alonso and Baker & McKenzie, is one that is a common occurrence in the world of 
arbitration and deeming such relationships, as automatically constituting partiality may 
be unreasonable for the successful future of international arbitration. Clear and defined 
standards of independence and impartiality would be valuable to ICSID as an institution 
in order to promote the neutrality of adjudicators, encourage the efficiency of arbitration 
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proceedings, and make arbitration attractive to investors and state alike. Thus, it remains 
unclear as to why the Chairman in Blue Bank failed to offer adequate evidence or reason 
as to why Alonso’s relationship with Baker & McKenzie implied that Alonso was a 
partial adjudicator in these arbitral proceedings.  
 
C. Burlington Resources v. Ecuador 
  
 In Burlington Resources v. Ecuador, Professor Francisco Orrego Vicuña 
(hereinafter “Vicuña”), a Chilean attorney, was disqualified from an ICSID panel 
adjudicating a dispute between Burlington Resources and Ecuador.
128
 Vicuña was 
appointed by Burlington Resources, the claimant, who was represented by the law firm 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (hereinafter “Freshfields”). 129  During the course of 
proceedings, Vicuña issued a dissenting opinion130 to a jurisdictional decision rendered in 
January 2010
131
 and a dissenting opinion on the “Decision on Liability” 132 in March 
2011. On July 8, 2013, counsel for Ecuador contacted Vicuña concerning news reports 
suggesting that Vicuña had been appointed by Freshfields’ clients to arbitrate multiple 
disputes, at least one of which included a separate attempt by an arbitrating party to 
disqualify Vicuña as a repeat arbitrator.
133
 Dechert Paris asked Vicuña to disclose all 
cases in which he had been appointed by Freshfields, and all assets and compensation 
received after submitting the requisite disclosures under ICSID Arbitration Rule 6.
134
 On 
July 24, 2013, Ecuador motioned for the disqualification of Vicuña.  Consequently, the 
arbitration proceedings were suspended. The Tribunal failed to reach a decision on the 
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disqualification.  Accordingly, the decision was reserved for the Chairman of the 
Administrative Council in accordance with Article 58 of the ICSID Convention.
135
  
 Ecuador’s disqualification proposal was based on three separate claims: 1) Vicuña 
had been appointed by Freshfields in an “unacceptably high number of cases;” 136  2) 
Vicuña had breached his obligation to disclose circumstances that might affect his 
reliability for independent judgment;
137
 and 3) Vicuña had demonstrated a “blatant lack 
of impartiality to the detriment of Ecuador” during the course of arbitration.138  
 Burlington responded alleging that Ecuador’s proposal was a dilatory measure 
aimed at sabotaging the arbitral proceedings because it was not made “promptly”139 and 
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i. Eni Dacion v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case. No. ARB/07/04 
ii. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador (ICSID Case. No. ARB/08/05 
iii. Itera International Energy LLC and Itera Group NV v. Gerogia  (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/07) 
iv. EVN AG v. Macedonia, former Yugoslav Republic  (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/10) 
v. Pan American Energy LLC v. Plurinational State of Bolivia (ICSID Case No. ARB/10/8) 
vi. Ampal-American Israel Corporation and others v. Arab Republic of Egypt  (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/12/11) 
vii. Rusoro Mining Ltd. v. Boliviarian Republic of Venezuela (ICSID Case No. ARB 
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viii. Repsol S.A. and Repsol Butano S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/38). 
    See id. at ¶ 22.  
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 With respect to the second ground for disqualification, Ecuador contended that Professor Orrego Vicuña 
failed to fulfill his duty of disclosure “both prior to and after his appointment.”
 
Ecuador argued that at the 
time Professor Orrego Vicuña was appointed in the present case, he did not disclose his prior or 
contemporaneous appointments by Freshfields in the ENI Dación BV v. Venezuela and Itera v. Georgia 
ICSID cases. Ecuador noted that subsequently, Professor Orrego Vicuña failed to disclose his appointments 
by Freshfields in five additional ICSID cases, contrary to the obligation he had assumed in his 2008 
Declaration.
 
 Furthermore, Ecuador argued that Professor Orrego Vicuña had adopted an inconsistent view 
of his duty of disclosure.
 
To substantiate its allegation, Ecuador submitted Professor Orrego Vicuña’s 
declaration of June 6, 2011 in Pan American Energy v. Bolivia, a case in which Dechert acted as counsel 
for Bolivia and in which Professor Orrego Vicuña disclosed that he had been appointed as an arbitrator by 
Freshfields in Itera, EVN, and Burlington. See id.  at ¶ 25-6.  
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the Tribunal decided that Ecuador had sufficient information to file a proposal for disqualification based on 
repeat appointments, non-disclosure, or the existing dissent to the 2010 Decision on Jurisdiction well 
before the actual filing of the proposal and thus, the filing was not prompt and constitutes a waiver. In 
contrast, Vicuña’s conduct after the July 8th letter was raised in a timely matter. Id. at ¶¶ 75-76. 
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failure to do so amounted to a waiver.
140
 Because Ecuador waited until information about 
Vicuña’s involvement in Repsol v. Argentina became publically available, the 
disqualification proposal was untimely and the delayed challenge amounted to a 
waiver.
141
 Secondly, Burlington asserted that Ecuador’s proposal threatened the due 
process rights of all parties in investment arbitration to their choice of arbitrators under 
the ICSID convention.
142
 Thirdly, Burlington argued that arbitrator reappointment is not a 
per se grounds for arbitrator disqualification.
143
  To disqualify an arbitrator for 
reappointment, the party challenging the arbitrator’s qualifications must allege that 
reappointment somehow impedes the arbitrator’s independent assessment of the 
underlying dispute.  Here, Burlington argued, Vicuña was not economically dependent on 
Freshfields because he did not derive a significant portion of his income from his prior 
appointments by Freshfields’ clients. 144  Finally, Burlington argued that upholding 
Ecuador’s challenge based on repeat appointment would have a negative systemic effect 
on investment arbitration, and that repeat appointments are a necessary part of the 
practice for the foreseeable future.
145
 
Vicuña claimed that he disclosed all of his Freshfields appointments in 
accordance with Ecuador’s request, and believed that none of his previous or ongoing 
appointments interfered with his ability to impartially adjudicate the current dispute.
146
 
He stated that all requested information was posted on the ICSID website, and that his 
actions differed in Rusoro v. Venezuela,
147
 a dispute arising out of an expropriation claim 
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disclosure was considered subject to suspicion by Ecuador.  
In Repsol v. Argentina, the Chairman rejected the proposal to disqualify Vicuña. Argentina alleged 
that it successful nullification of awards in CMS, Enron, and Sempra, Vicuña was biased against Argentina 
and thus could not be impartial in the proceedings. Repsol S.A., and Respsol Butano S.A. v. Republic of 
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Argentina as required by Article 57. See id, at ¶¶ 78-79. Furthermore, the Chairman concluded that 
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by a Canadian miner, because Rusoro requested a list of all his appointments.
148
 In sum, 
Vicuña rejected Ecuador’s claims of partiality during the course of arbitration.149  
 In ruling on Vicuña’s arbitral eligibility, the Chairman of the Administrative 
Counsel, like the tribunal chair in Blue Bank, noted that proof of actual dependence or 
bias is not necessary; it is sufficient to establish the appearance of dependence or bias.
150
 
According to the Chairman, whether a prior relationship between a challenged arbitrator 
and an adjudicating party constitutes the appearance of bias is an “objective standard 
based on a reasonable evaluation of the evidence by a third party.”151 The subjective 
belief of the party requesting the disqualification is not enough to satisfy the requirements 
of the Convention.
152
 The Chairman also noted that “manifest lack of the [Article 14(1)] 
qualities,” is defined as meaning “evident” or “obvious.”153  
 Applying Article 57 and 14(1), the Chairman laid out the three grounds for the 
possible disqualification of Vicuña: 1) Vicuña’s repeat appointments as arbitrator by 
Freshfields; 2) Vicuña’s non-disclosure of these appointments in prior to this case; and 3) 
Vicuña’s conduct as an arbitrator in the Burlington Resources adjudication, particularly 
his dissenting opinions to the 2010 Decision on Jurisdiction and 2012 Decision on 
Liability, and his conduct during the pre-hearing telephone conference.
154
   The Chairman 
determined that Ecuador had knowledge of Vicuña’s repeat appointments and dissenting 
opinions well before filing the proposal for disqualification. Accordingly, these claims 
were untimely, and Ecuador had waived its right to address them before the Tribunal.
155
 
Vicuña’s conduct after being confronted with non-disclosure of reappointment, however, 
was both timely and sufficient to challenge his qualifications.
156
 The Chairman also 
found that a reasonable third party conducting an evidentiary review of the matter would 
conclude that Vicuña’s conduct demonstrated an appearance of impartiality warranting 
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disqualification under ICSID Articles 14(1).
157
   Furthermore, based off of a reasonable 
evaluation of the July 31, 2013 explanations the Chairman concluded that a third party 
would conclude that Vicuña’s allegations into the ethics of counsel for Ecuador 
demonstrated an appearance of a lack of impartiality with respect to Ecuador and its 
counsel.
158
 Accordingly, the Chairman upheld Ecuador’s proposal to disqualify 
Vicuña.159  
  
D. Implications of Burlington 
 
 At first glance, the Chairman’s dismissal of Ecuador’s arguments that Vicuña 
should be disqualified due to his repeat appointments and dissenting opinions seem to 
offer little guidance on the establishment of more clear standards for disqualification.  
The sheer recognition of these proposals as potentially being appropriate means for 
disqualification, however, has important implications for ICSID proceedings moving 
forward. Undoubtedly, the Chairman’s analyses of the claims of lack of independence 
and impartiality stemming from repeat appointments and dissenting opinions would have 
been extremely helpful in constructing precise guidelines that parties could have utilized 
in the future to select unbiased adjudicators.  Moreover, arbitrators themselves could have 
utilized these guidelines to determine if they had a duty to disclose repeat appointments. 
Unfortunately, the Chairman’s failure to pursue these claims in his decision signifies a 
lost opportunity to explain why repeat appointments and dissenting opinions indicate a 
lack of independence and impartiality. The Chairman’s unwillingness to explore these 
claims may even show his own impartiality, for without establishing how Vicuña’s repeat 
appointments and dissents lack independence or impartiality, the Chairman’s assertions 
that these commonplace practices in international investment arbitration might be 
indicative of arbitral misconduct is largely baseless.  Repeat appointments and dissenting 
opinions are not uncommon in arbitration. In fact, in performing their prescribed duties as 
an adjudicator, arbitrators may lawfully issue dissenting opinions in pursuit of fair 
adjudication. Without showing how an arbitrator’s reasoning in a dissenting opinion 
reaches to the point of misconduct by revealing an obvious favoritism for or opposition 
against a single party, the Chairman in Burlington would have been viewed as punishing 
an arbitrator for diligently performing the duty he was appointed to execute.  
 The Chairman’s recognition that repeat appointments can be an appropriate 
grounds for the disqualification of an arbitrator, and his disqualification of Vicuña based 
of his July 31 accusations that Ecuador’s counsel was unethical, do in fact encourage 
Latin American states to perceive ICSID proceedings as a fairer and more equitable 
adjudicatory process. Although complete analysis is absent from the Chairman’s 
decision, the disqualification sets a preliminary standard.  No matter how tentative, that 
certain behavior by arbitrators and repeat appointments can be deemed as constituting 
dependence or partiality. Accordingly, parties may be less likely to select repeat 
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arbitrators or ones likely to act inappropriately, and arbitrators will be encouraged to 
disclose repeat appointments. Because arbitrators in international investment disputes are 
often perceived as favoring investors, Latin America may view this development in 
disqualification proceedings to note that repeat appointments can demonstrate a lack of 
neutrality as an advancement in the quest to ensure and promote the appointment of truly 
neutral adjudicators.  Furthermore, the Chairman’s willingness to recognize new and 
different grounds for disqualification demonstrates that arbitrator disqualification may be 
easier to achieve in the future and enhances the accountability of the system in the eyes of 
Latin America. 
  
 E. The Limits of Establishing a Standard for Independence and Impartiality 
  
As previously asserted, creating a well-defined standard of independence and 
impartiality under ICSID and clarifying when a conflict of interest exists and when an 
arbitrator has a duty to disclose, may place a degree of trust in Latin American states that 
tribunals constituted under ICSID remain a fair and effective way to adjudicate 
international investment disputes. The Chairmen’s overlooked opportunities in both Blue 
Bank and Burlington are undoubtedly a lost chance to more thoroughly shed light on the 
behavior, relationships, and characteristics of arbitrators that may render them partial. 
Yet, their decisions still serve as a beneficial first-step at formulating a clearer standard.  
Still, the benefits of creating such a standard may be limited. 
Even if standards of independence and impartiality are set, repeat arbitrators still 
create an appearance of bias. In order to ensure a process that is truly neutral, ICSID may 
eventually have to address this common practice. The problem is noticeably complicated 
and the solution must balance the rights of parties to appoint their choice of arbitrator and 
the need for the arbitral proceedings to remain neutral. Encouraging complete disclosure 
by arbitrators so that parties are aware of potential bias, or setting a time period between 
appointments that repeat arbitrators must wait until serving on another tribunal in order to 
encourage the diversification of the existing pool or arbitrators, may be appropriate, if not 
imperfect solutions. It may also prove to be more beneficial not to address the problem of 
partiality of repeat arbitrators because proposed solutions may not guarantee more neutral 
adjudicators, and the appearance of bias of repeat players does not necessarily equate to 
actual bias.  For example, in the instance that a tribunal consists of three arbitrators, the 
independence and impartiality of party-appointed arbitrators may be less concerning as 
long as the third arbitrator is deemed truly neutral.   
Another remaining question arising from the quest to define independence and 
impartiality is whether doing so will truly soothe the sentiments of distrust regarding 
ICSID in Latin America.  As previously noted, Latin America remains skeptical of ICSID 
as a fair adjudicatory process in part because of the 19
th
 century aggression and 
colonization by the West. The past history of oppression and interference by the North in 
Latin America has justifiably created tension between these regions, that continues due to 
differences in economic policy, politics, and culture.  These tensions may also be 
affecting Latin America’s perception of ICSID. Latin America’s expressed concern that 
the majority of ICSID cases being decided in favor of investors demonstrates a lack of 
impartiality and neutrality in ICSID may be but a mask to hide its displeasure with 
continuing to participate in arbitration proceedings that time and time again result in 
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unfavorable decisions for Latin American states. It must therefore be noted that if Latin 
America’s criticism of ICSID is in actuality the persistence of unfavorable decisions 
rendered by tribunals against state actors, establishing a standard for independence and 
impartiality may do little to urge Latin America to embrace ICSID.  
 
F. Conclusion 
 
  The decisions on the proposals to disqualify arbitrators in Blue Bank and 
Burlington Resources help to establish standards of independence and impartiality. In 
Blue Bank, the Chairman recognizes that Alonso had a conflict of interest stemming from 
the Longreef proceedings and accordingly, Alonso would be unable to exercise 
independent judgment as mandated by Article 14. Blue Bank establishes that financial 
and professional relationships may demonstrate arbitrator bias.  The decision in 
Burlington also creates a newfound willingness to consider repeat appointments as a basis 
for disqualification. Published reasoning for these disqualifications both clarifies and 
defines the standards for independence and impartiality for arbitrators. As the standards 
for independence and impartiality become more evident, Latin American countries will 
gain confidence in ICSID proceedings because they will be able to identify disqualifying 
characteristics of arbitrators and be assured that ICSID tribunals will now be willing to 
disqualify arbitrators lacking independence and impartiality.  Although the recent trend in 
utilizing the disqualification process helps to instill confidence within Latin America 
regarding the fairness of ICSID proceedings, hopefully the clearer standards established 
through recent published decisions will lead to a diminished need for the disqualification 
process as parties are able to identify neutral arbitrators at the onset in order to guard the 
efficiency and timeliness of the adjudication process. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
 Latin America’s complicated past with colonization has undoubtedly shaped its 
current skepticism of the fairness and neutrality of arbitration proceedings. Its history 
with ICSID in particular does not assuage perceptions of bias in investment arbitration. 
Instead, the unclear standards pertaining to independent judgment of arbitrators, 
disclosure, and the timely process of disqualification, combined with the low number of 
arbitrator disqualifications over time create a sentiment of mistrust and confusion. The 
benefit of the recent spike in disqualifications of arbitrators in Latin America is that the 
published decisions help create standards for independence and impartiality and show 
ICSID’s willingness to disqualify arbitrators who violate such standards. Moving 
forward, Latin America will hopefully gain confidence in the system because it is able to 
identify relationships that require disclosure, define qualities within arbitrators that will 
constitute grounds for disqualification, and see that arbitrators of both investors and 
developing nations alike will be held to a uniform set of standards. 
 
 
 
 
